Philos Public Aff 9 2 — Google Scholar. Orend B Justice after war. Orend B The morality of war. Broadview, Peterborough Google Scholar. Pogge T An institutional approach to humanitarian intervention.
Public Aff Quart 6 1 — Google Scholar. Ramsey P The just war: force and political responsibility. Walzer M Just and unjust wars. Walzer M Arguing about war. Ethics guide. Against the Theory of the Just War. Against the Theory of the Just War Against the Theory of the Just War Some people argue that the Just War doctrine is inherently immoral, while others suggest that there is no place for ethics in war. Here are some of the arguments that have been put forward: all war is unjust and has no place in any ethical theory morality must always oppose deliberate violence just war ideas tend to make violence OK, rather than restrain it war so disrupts the normal rules of society that morality goes out of the window.
See also. Religion and Ethics home Religions. Belfield , sought to distinguish between murder and assassination, the latter being justifiable according to the higher purposes sought. This is analogous to just war theorists seeking to put mass killing on a higher moral ground than pure massacre and slaughter and is fraught with the same problems raised in this article and in the just war literature.
On grounds of discrimination, assassination would be justifiable if the target were legitimate and not, say, the wife or children of a legitimate target. On grounds of proportionality, the policy would also be acceptable, for if one man or woman a legitimate target by virtue of his or her aggression should die to avoid further bloodshed or to secure a quicker victory, then surely assassination is covered by the just war theory?
The founder of the Hashshashin society c. Once initiated, assassination tends to become the norm of political affairs — indeed, civil politics would thus crumble into fearful and barbaric plots and conspiracies as did Rome in its last centuries in a race to gain power and mastery over others rather than to forge justifiable sovereignty.
Accordingly, they are complemented by other considerations that are not always explicitly taken up in the traditional exposition of jus In bello , this is especially true in the case of the issue of responsibility. Jus in bello requires that the agents of war be held responsible for their actions.
This ties in their actions to morality generally. Readily it can be accepted that soldiers killing other soldiers is part of the nature of warfare for which soldiers ought to be prepared and trained, but when soldiers turn their weapons against non-combatants, or pursue their enemy beyond what is reasonable, then they are no longer committing legitimate acts of war but acts of murder. The principle of responsibility re-asserts the burden of abiding by rules in times of peace on those acting in war to remind them that one day they will once more take up civilian status and should be prepared to do so conscientiously, free of any guilt from war crimes.
Responsibility for acts of war relate back to the tenets of jus ad bellum as well as jus in bello , for the justification of going to war involves responsibility as well as the acts ordered and committed in war. The aftermath of war involves the relinquishing of armed conflict as a means of resolving disputes and the donning of more civil modes of conduct but it also raises questions concerning the nature of the post bellum justice. Following the cessation of a war, three possibilities emerge: either the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a ceasefire.
Principles of justice may then be applied to each situation. It has often been remarked that justice, like history, is written by the victors. A defeated army and indeed the civilian body from which the army stems should thus be prepared to subject itself to the imposition of rules and forms of punishments, humiliation, and even retributions that it would not otherwise agree to.
The lives, values, and resources that have been fought for must now be handed over to the conquerors. The just war theorist is keen to remind warriors and politicians alike that the principles of justice following war should be universalizable and morally ordered and that victory should not provide a license for imposing unduly harsh or punitive measures or that state or commercial interests should not dictate the form of the new peace.
In post-war Iraq date , the rehabilitation programs have met with mixed success and have often been criticized for favoring some ethnic groups over others, i. Criticism may stem from either intrinsicist reasons that the defeated should still be viewed as a people deserving moral respect and their traditions held as sacrosanct or consequentialist reasons that punitive impositions are likely to produce a backlash ; but again it is worth reminding that just war theory tends to merge the two to avoid awkward implications derived from either position singly.
At this point, the attraction for jus post bellum thinkers is to return to the initial justice of the war. Consider a war of self-defense: this is considered by most, except absolute pacifists, to be the most justifiable of all wars.
If the people are defeated but their cause remains just, should they then continue the fight to rid their country of all the vestiges of occupation? What if fighting is impossible?
A realist, however, may ask how a people are to regain their freedom if they do not raise arms against their sea of troubles? Others may counsel civil disobedience and other forms of intransigence to signal displeasure. The aggressor, one who initiates war, puts the individual or the community into a state of war, he argues, and so the defender has an absolute prerogative to use whatever force necessary to secure freedom and peace: accordingly, in victory, the victors may enslave or kill the aggressors.
Indeed, King Alfred the Great of Wessex c. Here we enter the debates regarding punishment: does punishing a violator make any sense except to exact either retribution, revenge, or to promote a deterrence? Can the victors be sure of their claim to punish the aggressors and what good could possibly flow from bringing more violence or enslavement to the world? In asserting the need to find universalisable principles, the just war theorist is usually keen to insist that any war crimes trials are held in neutral states and presided over by neutral parties, rather than the victors whose partiality in proceedings must be presumed: after all, in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, no allied generals or politicians were held accountable for the atrocities created by bombing civilian centers in Germany and Japan and the dropping of nuclear bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
The end game and hence the jus post bellum certainly merit attention before the battles are lost or won: what should be the ruling affairs once the peace is proclaimed? Is it right that an army should demand unconditional surrender, for instance, when such a policy may entail a protracted war for no incentive is given to the other side to surrender; on the other hand, unconditional surrender implies a derogatory view of the enemy as one not to be respected either in or after war.
Yet if an unconditional surrender policy does suitably raise the stakes of fighting war it may act as a sufficient deterrent against possible aggressors or act as a useful diplomatic tool to bring a worried enemy back to peaceful overtures. Similarly, is it right that an army should demand reparations in advance rather than leave them undisclosed and thereby risk the uncertainty of punishment creating a backlash from the defeated, who may not wish to be so subjected?
Of course, if promises of an amnesty or fair treatment of prisoners is reneged on by the victor, then all trust for future arrangements is lost and the consequences imply embedding hatreds and mistrust for generations. Assume that victory is given, that the army has defeated its enemy on the battlefield so attention turns to the nature of the post bellum justice of dealing with the defeated regardless of its intentions beforehand. Consider the demands for reparations.
A defeated aggressor may just be asked to pay for the damage incurred by the war as justice demands of criminals that they pay for their crimes. But to what extent should the reparations extend? Should a war be indecisive though, the character of the peace would presumably be formed by the character of the ceasefire — namely, the cessation of fighting would imply a mere hiatus in which the belligerents regain the time and resources to stock their defenses and prepare for further fighting.
As such, a ceasefire would be merely a respite for the military to regain its strengths. However, just war theory also acts to remind contenders that war is a last resort and that its essential aim is always peace, so if peace is forthcoming in any guise, it is morally critical for all parties to seek a return to a permanent peace rather than a momentary lapse of war.
This article has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails. The theory bridges theoretical and applied ethics, since it demands an adherence, or at least a consideration of meta-ethical conditions and models, as well as prompting concern for the practicalities of war. A few of those practicalities have been mentioned here. Other areas of interest are: hostages, innocent threats, international blockades, sieges, the use of weapons of mass destruction or of anti-personnel weapons for example, land mines , and the morality and practicalities of interventionism.
Alexander Moseley Email: alexandermoseley icloud. Just War Theory Just war theory deals with the justification of how and why wars are fought. Introduction Historically, the just war tradition—a set of mutually agreed rules of combat—may be said to commonly evolve between two culturally similar enemies.
The Jus Ad Bellum Convention The principles of the justice of war are commonly held to be: having just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used.
The Principles Of Jus In Bello The rules of just conduct within war fall under the two broad principles of discrimination and proportionality. Jus post bellum Following the cessation of a war, three possibilities emerge: either the army has been defeated, has been victorious, or it has agreed to a ceasefire. Conclusion This article has described the main tenets of the just war theory, as well as some of the problems that it entails. References and Further Reading Anscombe, Elizabeth.
In Ethics, Religion, and Politics. University of Minnesota Press. Aquinas, St Thomas. Politics and Ethics. Augustine, St. City of God. Belfield, Richard Assassination: The Killers and their Paymasters Revealed. Magpie Books. Burke, Edmund Reflections on the Revolution in France. Dockrill, Michael and Barrie Paskins The Ethics of War. Hobbes, Thomas Jokic Alexsander, and Anthony Ellis eds. Locke, John Two Treatises of Government. Cambridge University Press.
Machiavelli, Nicolo The Prince. Minear, Richard Moseley, Alexander and Richard Norman, eds. Moseley, Alexander An Introduction to Political Philosophy.
0コメント