Why balochistan matters

Most often terrorist attacks killing dozens get coverage due to viewership and ratings. It was not until that night that ISPR, the media wing of the Pakistani armed forces, issued a press release. If you need more representation and coverage, then do ask your government to pay and give advertising. It became one of the top trends. Another factor for the lack of coverage of Balochistan in mainstream media is the security narrative.

There is a narrative that hostile intelligence agencies are involved in sabotaging peace in the province. Therefore, media networks try to stay clear of Balochistan. Jillani says that when independent coverage is not allowed about Balochistan, it leads to a lack of understanding of the problem. Media coverage is then confined to the official narrative, which often suppresses the truth and misinforms the public. The Pakistani military has so far proven unable to eliminate militant organizations and the larger nationalist movement, despite conducting targeted assassination campaigns and kidnappings and making various attempts to discredit the nationalist movement by associating it with organized crime or terrorist groups.

Of course, every state opposes separatist tendencies, and Pakistan is no exception. They were struggling for more autonomy within the federal constitutional framework and for the government to respect the socioeconomic rights of the Baloch.

Now, a majority of the population wants more autonomy for the province but does not demand independence. The Baloch nationalist movement is divided between various separatists and factions asking for the autonomy of the province within the Pakistani federal framework, and it cannot achieve full separation from Pakistan.

The conflict now demonstrates the absurdity of a repression that is reinforcing the very threat it is intended to eliminate. The Pakistani security establishment proved relatively efficient in destroying Baloch social structures, but it has been unable to impose its writ on the province, much less propose viable alternative structures. Meanwhile, the security establishment has exacerbated ethnic tensions. The attempted Islamization of the province has led to less, not greater, control for the central government, and a hotbed of extremism is developing in a part of the population where it was previously unknown.

In their minds, the resilience of Baloch nationalism results from the persistent economic and social inequalities among the provinces that have been exacerbated by military repression and massive violations of human rights. Historically, Baloch nationalism relates to the broader national question in Pakistan.

Politically, it covers everything from aspirations to full independence from Pakistan to demands for autonomy within the Pakistani federation; the positions of the assorted nationalist parties and organizations vary over time. Sociologically, it is an evolving reality reflecting the evolution of the province as well as that of Pakistan itself.

Each of these dimensions is, of course, the object of an intense political struggle. But reducing Baloch nationalism to a reminiscence of feudalism led by reactionary sardars has been for Pakistani central governments a convenient—but inaccurate—way to deny its popular dimension and its very existence. Many of the most active parties promote independence, although the leanings of many Baloch have diverged from that stance. According to Baloch nationalists, the broader Baloch nationalist movement that produced these groups has deep and broad roots—a two-thousand-year-long history.

Some historians, however, date the emergence of Baloch nationalism to the anticolonial struggle of the late nineteenth century, when the princely state of Khalat encompassed modern-day Balochistan. The rivalry between the British and Russian empires that led to the first British invasion of Afghanistan brought the British forces to Balochistan in their effort to control the supply roads to Kabul. For other historians Baloch nationalism truly emerged nearer in time to the creation of Pakistan.

Inspired by the Soviet revolution in Russia and the Indian independence movement led by Gandhi and Nehru, nationalist leaders had campaigned for an independent Balochistan during the last decades of the Raj. On August 15, , one day after the creation of Pakistan, the khan of Khalat declared his state independent—though essentially as a bargaining position—proposing to negotiate a special relationship with Pakistan in the domains of defense and foreign affairs.

The Pakistani leadership rejected the declaration of independence, and Khalat was forcibly annexed to Pakistan nine months later.

A Baloch resistance, which crystallized around the objective of protecting the populations and their interests and was inspired by Marxist-Leninist liberation movements, emerged shortly after the brief encounters of Although still under the authority of a member of the Marri tribe, this infrastructure extended far beyond Marri territory.

By July , 22 nationalist camps had been established, spanning from the Mengal areas of central Balochistan to the Marri territory in the northeast of the province. Some full-time volunteers ran the operations. President and later Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto had given Pakistan a democratic constitution but refused to respect the norms he had helped to establish.

In , he dissolved the provincial government formed by the opposition National Awami Party NAP and accused its main leaders of attempting to sabotage the foundations of the state.

The most radical elements of the nascent Baloch nationalist movement then joined the guerilla effort initiated by the Marris and Mengals. Only after General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq launched a military coup did negotiations begin, resulting in the eventual withdrawal of the army from the province and the liberation of the Baloch leadership and several thousand activists.

The emergence of Baloch nationalism as it is known today is the product of a long and complex process of emancipation of the Baloch middle class, often educated outside Balochistan. This middle class nationalism emerged in parallel and frequently in dialogue with the growing nationalism of Balochi tribes, until time and military operations eroded tribal identity.

Baloch nationalism grew within the tribal structures before gradually spreading to other sectors of society. The tribal character of Baloch nationalism is as much a question of politics as of sociology or anthropology.

Balochistan is divided among eighteen major tribes and a number of lesser tribes and clans. Marris and Bugtis, more historically prone to military confrontation, are the most politically important of them. Given the power of tribes, the differences between them, and their at times fraught interactions, the tribal question is still an essential component of any discussion on Baloch nationalism and has long been the main argument of those who refuted the existence of a Baloch nation.

On the lingual basis Brohis have as much in common with the Balochis as Tamils have with Pashtuns. Even in the birthplace of Baloch nationalism, the Khanate of Khalat, Brohi is the dominant language. This disunity further contributes to the long-standing doubts that many Pakistani intellectuals hold about the existence of a Baloch nation. They constituted an easy scapegoat for the military government, which, interestingly, stated at the time that only 7 percent of the province was involved in the insurgency but did not explain why the remaining 93 percent that it did control was similarly underdeveloped.

Among the some 28 major sardars of importance in Balochistan, only three had openly revolted against the federal government. Today, the Baloch movement is led by the educated middle class. With the exception of the Bugtis and Marris, the most popular leaders belong to this category. This class is underrepresented in the higher echelons of the Pakistani army and the administration, and it provides a substantial part of the educated cadre of the Baloch nationalist movement.

As a result, the geography of the resistance has changed, shifting from rural to urban areas and from the northeast of the province to the southwest. Sometimes it spills over to cities like Karachi. The sociological shift within the nationalist movement stems partly from the historical evolution of the movement itself, partly from the destruction of tribal structures in the most restive areas such as Dera Bugti or Kohlu, and partly from the increased involvement of areas where tribal structures are not dominant.

All of these factors combine to strengthen Baloch nationalism in these areas while marginalizing the sardars. Many Baloch nationalist leaders now come from the urbanized districts of Kech, Panjgur, and Gwadar and to a lesser extent from Quetta, Khuzdar, Turbat, Kharan, and Lasbela.

They are well-connected to Karachi and Gulf cities, where tribal structures are nonexistent. In fact, while there is violence all over the province, the insurgency seems to concentrate mainly in these urbanized areas. Thus, the middle class is today the main target of the Pakistani military and paramilitary in what seems to be an attempt to eradicate all manifestations of Baloch nationalism and to rule out the very possibility of its renaissance.

Most people involved in the insurgency today are said to be under the age of thirty and to belong to the middle class. All organizations have had to radicalize—at least rhetorically—or else lose the support of their constituencies. As long as the Pakistani center accepted nationalist representation, the nationalist leadership remained open to compromise.

This possibility disappeared—or at least greatly diminished—as soon as it became clear that the military regime was seeking the elimination of the nationalist leadership.

Throughout the s, ethnic tensions had greatly diminished, thanks to robust representative participatory institutions. Nationalist parties emerged as significant forces. In the election, the combined vote for nationalist parties totaled It reached The Election Observation Mission of the European Union reported vote tampering before, during, and after the elections.

The Election Commission of Pakistan was accused of diluting strongholds of parties opposing the regime and favoring its supporters. The eligibility criteria for candidates were changed to require university degrees, but madrassa diplomas were considered equivalent. The Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties found themselves fundamentally affected. A Baloch, Mohammad Jam Yusaf, was appointed chief minister, but had little control over even his own cabinet, which was dominated by the Jamaat-Ulema-u-Islam, a conservative Islamist party.

Determined to eradicate Baloch nationalism, Musharraf accelerated the arrest of its leaders even before the beginning of the hostilities. A parliamentary committee including members of the Baloch opposition convened in September and wrote recommendations designed to form the basis of a negotiation, but the situation kept deteriorating. Even when a compromise with Akbar Bugti seemed imminent, Musharraf deliberately opted for confrontation.

General Musharraf also attempted to tackle the Baloch issue politically by launching a devolution plan that bypassed the provincial assemblies to create local governments entirely dependent on the central government for their survival.

Although presented as a form of decentralization, all provinces except Punjab perceived the scheme to be an imposition of a centralized form of government and a negation of provincial autonomy—clearly an irritant for Baloch nationalists.

The army intervened in Dera Bugti, the epicenter of the rebellion, leading to significant population displacements. Extrajudicial killings, torture, and illegal arrests by security forces and the intelligence agencies became the norm. In Balochistan, the post-Musharraf era started before the formal end of the Musharraf presidency in Rather than substituting a political dynamic for military repression, the new situation was characterized by parallel political processes, whose timid attempts at reconciliation could never compensate for an increasingly vicious and brutal security presence.

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Saudi Arabia launches app to facilitate overseas Umrah pilgrims. Political heat turns up as PML-Q warns of action. What is wrong in Balochistan and what can be done to undo the despair? This is not rocket science; the problem lies in flawed political and economic development policies and strategies. With little vision, they care little about futuristic strategies.

They are not bothered about strategies for socio-economic challenges that are exacerbated by an outdated governance, management and development model, functioning in the province. With such a strategic land and sea mass and economic potential, Balochistan deserves area size attention rather than population-based focus. Unremitting ignorance has the potential to increase insecurity and violence that is fuelled by the growing despair amongst the politically conscious youth.

In addition, the population deserves various people-oriented welfare schemes and social safety nets to improve public life in many aspects, such as education, healthcare, infant mortality, maternal mortality, potable water, electricity, safe housing conditions, and sanitation facilities. There are many successful lessons from China and many other developing nations with regard to poverty eradication. These strategies consisted of two components.